

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-100

19 March 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM:

[REDACTED]

Chairman

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SUBJECT: Technical Countersurveillance During IC Testimony on the Hill

REFERENCE:

[REDACTED]

(Chief of Staff, NSA) Memo to You dated 2 March 1982,
Subject: Sweeping of Congressional Hearing Rooms

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1. This is for your information. This outlines Security Committee actions concerning technical countersurveillance during testimony on the Hill. A copy of reference and your guidance has been provided to [REDACTED] [REDACTED] CIA Member of the Security Committee. His response is not yet available.

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2. The Security Committee's Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee recently addressed this matter. Their findings include:

a. The threat of technical penetration is weighed differently by different departments, and resource commitments reflect their different evaluations. All departments with countermeasure capabilities report resource shortages. Thus, they must prioritize taskings.

b. Other security features in effect on the Hill reduce the risk of technical penetration in comparison with the threat to less guarded targets, primarily facilities abroad.

c. There is considerable variation in the number of times different departments testify on the Hill and in the sensitivity of their testimony. Only testifying departments can judge whether they need to commit countermeasure resources on any given occasion.

d. The Capitol Hill Police have a countermeasures capability. Some agencies are willing to let them provide all coverage. There

has been discussion of offering them training at the Community's [redacted] to develop and maintain their proficiency. This issue was unresolved because available training slots were limited and IC agencies had priority claims.

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e. It was agreed that each department would provide coverage for its own Principal Officers during sensitive testimony on the Hill. However, when there would be back-to-back testimony in the same hearing rooms, the first agency would maintain coverage during subsequent testimony if resources permitted and this was mutually agreeable. (I brought this issue to SECOM Member attention on 21 October 1981. A copy of my memorandum is attached (see paragraph 3).)

3. CIA technical security officers have often been present on the Hill to support frequent appearances by the DCI, DDCI and other senior CIA officers. This appears to be the basis for the erroneous perception that CIA provides coverage for others as a service of common concern. CIA has never done so. The issue never came up before and if it had, CIA's resource position would have required review and probably some augmentation.

4. The SECOM will address the NSA proposals and explore further with the Capitol Hill Police the possibility of offering them training and advice on equipment.

5. We will keep you informed.

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Attachment

cc: D/OS/CIA

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